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ABSTRACT
Smart cities have been identified as areas which are urbanized and utilize diverse types of electronic data collection sensors that are
used to oversee resources and assets efficiently. Smart meters are a unit of smart cities and they collect information about users and
their consumption patterns. Consequently, the Internet of Things (IoT) being at a steady evolution has prompted multiple users into
having their data collected from smart meters, stored on cloud servers. This is a way of saving costs and time involved in accessing
the data. In spite of that, the cloud-assisted IoT faces privacy and security issues. This is as a result of the cloud servers possessing
an untrusted nature. Due to this, it is essential for the data accumulated from the smart meters be encrypted hitherto outsourcing it
to the cloud server. However, having encrypted data in the cloud server leads to a complication when it comes to accessing the data.
For users who are on a different public key system, it becomes illogical for the users to first download the entire data on the cloud
in order to access the required data. Therefore to resolve this issue, a heterogeneous systems public key encryption with equality
test (HS-PKE-ET) scheme was proposed. The HS-PKE-ET scheme integrates certificateless public cryptography with equality test
(CLC-ET) with the public key encryption with equality test (PKI-ET). This scheme allows an authorized cloud server to determine
if two encryptions encrypted within heterogeneous systems possess equivalent messages. Basing on the random oracle model, the
proposed scheme’s security is stated under the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption together with the computational Diffie-Hellman
assumption. Ultimately the size of storage, computation complexities and properties with other related works are focused on and
illustrations indicate our proposed scheme reflects a good performance.
Keywords: Smart grid, cloud, heterogeneous systems equality test.
_____________________
*Corresponding author
INTRODUCTION
Based on the challenging new network possibilities, and on steerage competitiveness profits and network improvement e orts, the
concept of "smart" cities has seemed. (Batamuliza, 2018.) states that a lot of effort has been put in smart cities to understand and
engage in a world that is increasingly connected. This clearly means growth in urban environments in terms of education,
healthcare, transportation, etc. Consequently the concept of "smartness" has been embraced in all the aforementioned areas in order
to fulfill the demands that have emerged as a result of their growth. Based on the facts given by the communication technologies,
the growth of these utilities will result to better, efficient ways of living for their users. The growth of IoT however can be
considered to be a booster for the growth of these utilities. And as a result growth of data generated from these utilities is
experienced such as data from smart watches, smart healthcare, smart vehicles and so forth. This data therefore requires processing
and storage and hence the cloud servers are responsible for these functionalities. They however require a great extent of network
resources which culminates to the security and privacy of this data is being compromised. This is because the cloud servers have
been rendered insecure putting the security and privacy of users into the limelight. A case in point is where body sensors collect the
health status of a user during a workout and upload to the cloud. This information is considered personal and needs to be kept safe.
And because of that, users have taken to protect the privacy of their data before storing it to the cloud servers. The continuous
growth of such smart devices means a rise in demands for power usage for these devices (Jokar, Arianpoo, & Leung, 2016). And
considering that the current power networks cannot fully bare the demands, smart grid has been considered a new solution to this
challenge. Smart grid aims at ensuring reliable digital responses to the quickly changing electricity demands and concurrently
focusing on providing efficient and reliable power systems. The fact that the smart grid has been put into implementation, just like
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any other technologies, it experiences security and privacy difficulties (Li, Lu, Wang, & Choo, 2016). Devices located from homes,
businesses, vehicles to personal gadgets collect information about their users and usage patterns and thereafter upload them to the
cloud. As earlier mentioned the information from these devices is confidential and needs to be secured and to ensure this, the data
is therefore encrypted before it’s uploaded to the cloud servers. And because of this, public-key encryption has proved to be an
efficient way to ensure that there is confidentiality. This is achieved by the smart devices using the public key of receivers within
the network to encrypt the users’ sensitive data before uploading to the cloud server. With this, the data that is uploaded to the
cloud is secured. Therefore in cases where an authorized user wants to access this data the user is required to download the data
and then use his/her own private key to decrypt the data in order to access it. However this is quite a tiresome and time-consuming
process in situations where the data is in huge amounts. With this in consideration, to ensure that a user’s information is not
disclosed whenever their data is searched; search functionality is supported in the ciphertexts that are stored in the cloud server.
This allows for the searchability, with no information related to the ciphertexts being exposed. This idea was first proposed by
Boneh et al. (2004), where the keyword search function was incorporated into Public Key Cryptography and is known as PKE-KS.
However, PKE-KS being able to support search functionality still experiences a drawback where the search function only works
for ciphertexts encrypted under the same public key.
To deal with this drawback, Yang et al. (2010) presented a scheme known as Public Key Encryption with Equality Test(PKE-ET)
where an equality test can not only be performed on ciphertexts encrypted under the same public key but also under different
public keys. Consequently a lot of work has been put into improving the equality test scheme such as (Tang, 2011; Ma, Zhang,
Huang, & Yang, 2014; Huang et al., 2015; Lee, Ling, Seo, & Wang, 2016a; Ma, Huang, Zhang, & Yang, 2015; Xu et al., 2017).
As a matter of fact, all the above-mentioned schemes have their construction based on the traditional Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI). A further look into these schemes by (Ma, 2016) resulted in the idea of PKE-ET being incorporated with Identity-based
public key cryptosystem. This brought forth identity-based encryption with outsourced equality test (IBE-ET) that was built on the
basis of IBC. The breakthrough in this scheme was that it managed to take a user’s identity as their public key hence eliminate
certificates found within the PKI. However, the scheme still experiences difficulties as a result of key escrow. Key escrow happens when decryption keys are put in the care of third parties. Here the third parties have access to a user’s encrypted data and can
access it any time.
Al-Riyami et al. (2003) however found a way to deal with the key escrow. He proposed a certificateless public key cryptosystem
(CL-PKC) where user private keys were in two parts; one in possession of the user while the other in possession of the key
generator center (KGC). This means that the KGC can partially access a user’s private key, which is a good thing since the third
parties are excluded from accessing users’ data. More research led to Qu et al. (2018) proposing a new notion where he
incorporated CL-PKC with equality test (CL-PKC-ET). An observation into the above-mentioned schemes indicates their
homogenous nature, in that they can only be used in environments observing the same public key cryptography. Hence none of
them can be considered for a cloud-assisted IoT environment that is heterogeneous. Furthermore, we recognize that currently, no
public key encryption scheme with equality test is pertinent in the current environment.
To address this issue, we establish an effective public key encryption scheme that provides a heterogeneous systems equality test
(abbreviated as HS-PKE-ET). A typical application scenario using HS-PKE-ET is shown in Figure 1. Within a smart grid
environment, the data being conveyed (i.e., between the smart meter and cloud server) requires encryption to guarantee users’
privacy. Namely, a public key encryption scheme that efficiently provides equality test in a heterogeneous environment is therefore
required hence the public key infrastructure (PKI) and the certificateless public key system are merged. The PKI has proved to be
efficient when it comes to achieving user identity authentication and security of data, the customers usually choose to use the PKI
system to encrypt data. However, the CLC system has solved the certificate management problems brought by the PKI system and
the problem of key escrow within the IBC system, most smart meters choose to use the CLC system to encrypt data. The collected
data is encrypted by the smart meter and uploaded to the cloud server. A case in point is a customer wanting to retrieve their
information stored on the cloud server (i.e., consumption of electricity on specific days). The customer will have to make use of
their secret key to generate trapdoors, which will be forwarded to the cloud server. This cloud server however has been delegated
the task of searching the data and then returning the results to the customer. Formerly, performing equality test for customers in
different public key systems required them to encrypt the accumulated information using the identity of the smart meter owners.
Considering that different smart meters are matched to different identities, it is imperative that customers find identities that match
all smart meters. However, this results to substantial overhead and that is where our scheme is incorporated since it diminishes
vapid process as it improves the operating efficiency.
Our contribution
This paper nominates a heterogeneous system public key encryption with equality test (HS-PKE-ET) with the integration between
(PKE-ET) and (CLC-ET) as the center of attention. We base it on the bilinear pairing design that is depicted for smart grid
environment. Our scheme security will be proved under the BDH assumption and the CDH assumption in the random oracle model
(ROM). A demonstration of how the scheme will perform shall be illustrated in terms of computation and communication costs
incurred through storage size, encryption, decryption, and testing phases.
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Figure 1: A typical scenario of the smart meter.
RELATED WORKS
Boneh et al. (2004) proposed a way of searching the public key encryption scheme by the use of key-words known as Public Key
Encryption with Keyword search (PKE-KS). The ciphertexts in this scheme would be run through an equivalence test to determine
if the keywords are the same. This is done by a third-party that is considered semi-trusted. The unfortunate issue is that IBE-KS has
limitations when it is applied in real-time applications. Yang et al. (2010) however solved this limitation by proposing an
encryption scheme that incorporated the equality test, not only on ciphertexts encrypted with the same public keys but also with
different public keys. This scheme was known as Public Key Encryption with Equality Test (PKE-ET). The advantage of this
scheme is that, it is quite flexible since an authorized cloud server has the search functionality hence can search messages to
ascertain whether two ciphertexts encrypted with same or different public keys are equivalent. Consequently, (Tang, 2011)
proposed a scheme that would enforce authorization on the PKE-ET which was known as fine-grained authorization Public key
encryption with equality test (FG-PKE-ET). This scheme made provision for only two users to perform equality test. Nevertheless,
there were situations where delegated parties were the only ones required to finish work in practical multi-user settings. Hence a
delegated equality test scheme was of importance leading Ma et al. (2014) to propose such a scheme, which was known as (PKEDET). Additionally, Ma et al. (2015) improved the PKE-AET by introducing support of flexibility when it came to authorization
which was known as PKE-ET-FA. Unfortunately the public key infrastructure has proved to be unreliable when it comes to
scalability since the distribution of public keys is unmanageable. New research areas on Identity-based encryption have hence
sprouted as shown by (Ma, 2016; Lee, Ling, Seo, & Wang, 2016b; Wu, Zhang, Choo, & He, 2017). This encryption scheme has
considered the outsourcing of equality tests in order to make the process more flexible when it comes to certificates management.
And despite this encryption souring from key escrow, Lin et al. (2016) managed to find a solution by introducing the notion of
certificateless public cryptography incorporated with equality test.
DEFINITIONS
Preliminaries
Bilinear Map
Considering two multiplicative cyclic groups 𝔾 , 𝔾 , and their prime order is 𝑝. 𝑔 is a generator of 𝔾 . A bilinear map e :
𝔾 ⨉𝔾 → 𝔾 is required as follows:
1. Bilinearity: ∀𝑔 ∈ 𝔾 , ∃𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝑍 ∗ , 𝑒(𝑔 , 𝑔 ) = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) .
2. Non-degeneracy: 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) ≠ 1.
Hardness Problems
Establishing our scheme under the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem and the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem,
the security of our system is defined. We describe these two hardness problems as follows:
BDH problem. Randomly choose , 𝑏, 𝑐 ∈ 𝑍 ∗ , the BDH assumption holds if for any polynomial-time algorithm 𝓐 which wants to
distinguish the tuple < 𝑔 , 𝑔 , 𝑔

, 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎𝑏𝑐

> from < 𝑔 , 𝑔 , 𝑔 , 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) > , the advantage is negligible.
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Figure 2: System Model of HS-PKE-ET.
CDH problem. Randomly choose 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 ∈ 𝑍 ∗ , the CDH assumption holds if for any polynomial-time algorithm 𝓐 which wants
to distinguish the tuple < 𝑔 , 𝑔 , 𝑔 > from < 𝑔 , 𝑔 , 𝑔 >, the advantage is negligible.
System model
Figure 2 illustrates the heterogeneous systems public key encryption with equality test (HS-PKE-ET). The HS-PKE-ET model is
made up of five entities: the smart meter, customer, key generation center (KGC), the certificate authority (CA), and a cloud server.
Smart meter belongs to the CLC system, while the customer belongs to the PKI system. For the CLC system the smart meter sends
its identity to the KGS, and the KGS prompts a corresponding partial secret key (D) and delivers it back to the smart meter.
Consequently, on the PKI system side customer communicates with the CA to obtain a certificate signed by the CA. The smart
meter and the customer then compute their particular trapdoors denoted by 𝑡𝑑
and 𝑡𝑑
, respectively. Subsequently, the smart
meter uses the owner’s ID to encrypt the collected data and uploads the encryptions alongside the trapdoor 𝑡𝑑
to the cloud
to the cloud server for
server for storage. When the customer desires to retrieve information, he/she uploads his/her trapdoor 𝑡𝑑
retrieval. The cloud server now possesses the 𝑡𝑑
and 𝑡𝑑
hence can execute an equivalence test between the CLC system and
PKI system.
Security Models
According to (Ma, 2016), one-way chosen-ciphertext attack (OW-CCA) security against the adversary in HS-PKE-ET is defined.
For streamlining, HS-PKE-ET-CLC to denote the situation that users belong to the CLC system and HS-PKE-ET-PKI to denote
the situation that users belong to the PKI system are used.
Definition 1. For the security of HS-PKE-ET-CLC we consider two types of adversaries. Type-1 adversary 𝒜 cannot retrieve the
system’s secret master key, but has the ability to replace any user’s public key. Type-2 adversary 𝒜 2 has no ability to replace a
user’s public key, but can retrieve the system’s master secret key. HS-PKE-ET-CLC’s security model is expounded by the
following two games:
Game 1: Given a security parameter λ , the game between 𝒜 and the challenger is defined as follows:
1.

Setup: The challenger creates the public parameters PubP and the master secret key msk. Finally, the challenger returns
PubP.
Phase 1: The 𝒜 is permitted to issue the following queries:

2.
•
•
•
•

Partial secret key queries < 𝐼𝐷 : The challenger sends Di to 𝒜 .
to 𝒜 .
Secret key queries < 𝐼𝐷 : The challenger sends 𝑠𝑘
to 𝒜 .
Public key queries < 𝐼𝐷 : The challenger sends 𝑝𝑘
Replace public key queries < 𝐼𝐷 , 𝑝𝑘
>: The challenger replaces the public key pk of the corresponding user with 𝑝𝑘 .
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•

Decryption queries< 𝐼𝐷 , 𝐶 >: The challenger runs the algorithm CLC-Decrypt
secret key corresponding to 𝐼𝐷 . Finally, the challenger gives M i to 𝒜 .

•

Trapdoor queries: The challenger creates the trapdoors 𝑡𝑑
algorithms, respectively. Eventually, the chal-lenger gives 𝑡𝑑

and 𝑡𝑑
and 𝑡𝑑

(𝐶 , 𝑠𝑘

is the

by using CLC-Trapdoor and PKI-Trapdoor
to 𝒜 .

3.

Challenge: The challenger randomly chooses the plaintext 𝑀 ∈ 𝐺 ∗ and computes
challenger sends C ' to 𝒜 as its challenge ciphertext.

4.

Phase 2: The challenger’s response to 𝒜 is similar to that in Phase 1 on the grounds that:

5.

) where 𝑠𝑘

Cʹ= CLC-Encrypt (𝐼𝐷 , 𝑀). Finally, the

•

IDch is not queried in the Secret key queries.

•
•

If the public key associated with 𝐼𝐷 is replaced, the 𝐼𝐷 should not be queried in the Partial secret key queries.
If the public key of the user is replaced, the corresponding identity 𝐼𝐷 should not be queried in the Secret key queries.

•

𝐼𝐷 , 𝐶 is not inquired in the Decryption queries.
Guess: 𝒜 outputs 𝑀 , and wins if 𝑀 = 𝑀. The advantage of 𝒜 in the game above is defined as follows:
𝐴𝑑𝑣

,

,

(𝜆) = 𝑃𝑟 𝑀 = 𝑀

Game 2: Provided with a security parameter 𝜆, the game between 𝒜 and the challenger is expounded as follows:
1.

Setup: The challenger generates the public parameters PubP and master secret key msk. Finally, the challenger gives PubP
and the msk to 𝒜 2.

2.

Phase 1: 𝒜 2 issues queries as in Game 1, except the Partial secret key queries and the Replace public key queries are not allowed
to issue in this game.

3.

Challenge: The challenger randomly picks the plaintext 𝑀 ∈ 𝐺 ∗ and computes
C ' = CLC-Encrypt (𝐼𝐷 , 𝑀). Finally, the challenger gives C ' to 𝒜2 as its challenge cipher-text.

4.

Phase 2: The challenger’s response to 𝒜 2 is similar to that in Phase 1 on grounds that:
• 𝐼𝐷 is not queried in the Secret key queries.
• (𝐼𝐷 , 𝐶 ∗ ) is not queried in the Decryption queries.

5.

Guess: 𝒜 2 outputs

M ' , and wins if M ' = M . Therefore, 𝒜 2 advantage in the game is:
𝐴𝑑𝑣

,

,

(𝜆) = 𝑃𝑟 𝑀 = 𝑀

Definition 2. For the security of HS-PKE-ET-PKI scheme, we said the HS-PKE-ET-PKI has OW-CCA property if no
polynomially bounded adversary 𝒜 has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.
1.
2.

3.

Setup: The challenger uses as input security parameters 𝜆. Then, the challenger accords the system parameters to 𝒜 and
retains the msk secret.
Phase 1: 𝒜 is allowed to inquire as follows:
o Key generation queries <i>: The challenger sends 𝑠𝑘
to 𝒜.
o Decryption queries<i,Ci>:The challenger runs PKI-Decrypt (𝐶 , 𝑠𝑘 ) algorithm and sends the plaintext M to
𝒜.
o Trapdoor queries <i>: The challenger creates the trapdoors 𝑡𝑑
and𝑡𝑑
by using CLC-Trapdoor and PKITrapdoor algorithms, respectively. Finally, the challenger sends 𝑡𝑑
and 𝑡𝑑
to 𝒜.
Challenge: The challenger arbitrary chooses a plaintext 𝑀 ∈ 𝐺 ∗ and computes Cʹ = PKI-Encrypt(𝑝𝑘 , 𝑀). In addition, the
associated with 𝑠𝑘
by using PKI-Trapdoor algorithm. Finally, the challenger sends
challenger creates a trapdoor 𝑡𝑑
to 𝒜.
(𝐶 , 𝑡𝑑 )
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Phase 2: In this phase, the response of C to 𝒜 is similar to the one obtained in Phase 1. The following constraints are
considered.
• < 𝑝𝑘 > is not requested in the key generation queries.

4.

•

< 𝑝𝑘 , 𝐶 > is not requested in the decryption queries.

Guess: 𝒜 outputs M ' ∈ G1* , and wins if 𝑀 = 𝑀 . The advantages of 𝒜 in the game above is defined as follows:

5.

𝐴𝑑𝑣

,

,

(𝜆) = 𝑃𝑟 𝑀 = 𝑀

CONSTRUCTION
The concrete constructions of heterogeneous systems public key encryption with equality test are instituted in this section.
1.

Setup: Provided a security parameter 𝜆, the algorithm runs as follows:
• Generate the pairing parameters: two groups 𝐺 , 𝐺 of prime order p and an admissible bilinear map 𝑒: 𝔾 x𝔾 →
𝐺 .Then choose a random generator 𝑔 ∈ 𝔾 .
• Choose cryptographic hash functions:
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑛 = |𝐺 |𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛 = 𝑍 ∗
𝐻 : 0,1 ∗ →, 𝐻 : 𝐺 → 𝐺 , 𝐻 : 𝐺 → 0,1
∗
• Randomly choose (𝑠 , 𝑠 ) ∈ 𝑍 , then set 𝑔 = 𝑔 and 𝑔 = 𝑔 . The CLC-PKG publishes system parameters <
𝑝, 𝐺 , 𝐺 , 𝑒, 𝑔, 𝑔 , 𝑔 , 𝐻 , 𝐻 , 𝐻 > and keeps the master secret key (𝑠 , 𝑠 ) secret.

2.

CLC-PKG: To generate public and secret key, this algorithm works as follows:

• Generate partial secret key: Given a string 𝐼𝐷 ∈ 0,1 ∗ :

– Compute
ℎ = 𝐻 (𝐼𝐷) ∈ 𝔾
– Compute partial secret key
𝐷 = (𝐷 , 𝐷 ) = ℎ , ℎ , where (𝑠 , 𝑠 ) is the master secret key.
• Assign secret value: The algorithm uses as inputs PubP and D. It chooses 𝑥 ∈ 𝑍 ∗ randomly then returns x as a secret
value.
• Assign secret key: The algorithm uses as inputs PubP, D, and x. It computes 𝑠𝑘 = (𝑠𝑘 , 𝑠𝑘 ) = (𝐷 , 𝐷 ) .
• Assign public key: The algorithm uses as inputs PubP and a secret value x. It returns public key
𝑝𝑘 = (𝑋, 𝑝𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘 ) = (𝑔 , 𝑔 , 𝑔 ).
3.

IBC-Trapdoor: This algorithm takes as input sk of a user in the CLC system and outputs a trapdoor 𝑡𝑑

4.

PKI-KG: A user in the PKI system chooses two arbitrary numbers 𝜃, 𝛽 ∈ 𝑍 ∗

5.

PKI-Trapdoor: This algorithm utilizes as input sk of a user in the PKI system and outputs a trapdoor 𝑡𝑑

6.

CLC-Encrypt: This algorithm proceeds as follows:
•
•
•

•

•
7.

,and computes

= 𝑠𝑘 = 𝐷 .

(𝑠𝑘, 𝑝𝑘) = ((𝜃, 𝛽), 𝑔 , 𝑔

)

=𝜃

Take the message 𝑀 ∈ 𝔾∗ , the identity ID, and the public key 𝑝𝑘 = (𝑋, 𝑝𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘 ) as inputs.
and 𝑒(𝑋, 𝑔 ) = 𝑒(𝑝𝑘 , 𝑔). If these verifications
Verify that if 𝑝𝑘 = (𝑋, 𝑝𝑘 , 𝑝𝑘 ) ∈ 𝔾∗ and 𝑒(𝑋, 𝑔 ) = 𝑒(𝑝𝑘 , 𝑔)
pass, perform the encryption. Otherwise, terminate the encryption.
Compute ℎ = 𝐻 (𝐼𝐷) ∈ 𝔾∗ .
Pick two arbitrary numbers (𝑟 , 𝑟 ) ∈ 𝑍 ∗ .

Compute 𝐶 = (𝐶 , 𝐶 , 𝐶 , 𝐶 ), where 𝐶 = 𝑔 , 𝐶 = 𝑔 , 𝐶 = 𝑀 ∙ 𝐻 (𝑒(ℎ , 𝑝𝑘 ) ), 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶 = (𝑀||𝑟 ) ⊕
𝐻 (𝑒(ℎ , 𝑝𝑘 ) ).
CLC-Decrypt: The algorithm uses as inputs a ciphertext C and a secret key sk. It returns the plaintext M by working as
follows.

•
•
•

Compute 𝐶 ⊕ 𝐻 𝑒(𝑠𝑘 , 𝐶 ) = 𝐶 ⊕ 𝐻 𝑒(𝑠𝑘 , 𝐶 ) = 𝐶 ⊕ 𝐻
(𝑀||𝑟 )
= 𝐻 (𝑒(𝑠𝑘 , 𝐶 )) .
Verify if 𝐶 = 𝑔 and
If both verifications pass, return M. Otherwise, return the symbol ┴.

𝑒 𝐷

,𝑔

= 𝐶 ⊕ 𝐻 (𝑒 ℎ , 𝑔
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8.

PKI-Encrypt: It utilizes as inputs a message M and the public key pk of a user in the PKI system. Then, it chooses two
random numbers (𝑟 , 𝑟 ) ∈ 𝑍 ∗ and computes
𝐶 = (𝐶 , 𝐶 , 𝐶 , 𝐶 )
, where
, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶 = (𝑀||𝑟 ) ⨁ 𝐻 (𝑔 )
𝐶 = 𝑔 ,𝐶 = 𝑔 ,𝐶 = 𝑀 ∙ 𝐻 𝑔
9.
PKI-Decrypt: It takes as inputs a ciphertext C and secret key sk of a user in the PKI system. Then, gives back the plaintext M
by computing 𝑀||𝑟 ← 𝐶 ⊕ 𝐻 (𝐶 ), and then verifies both 𝐶 = 𝑔
and
= 𝐻 (𝐶 ) . In the event that both
verifications pass, it returns M else, it returns the symbol ⊥ .

10.

Test (𝐶 , 𝑡𝑑 , 𝐶 , 𝑡𝑑 ): Let 𝑈 and 𝑈 be two users of heterogeneous systems. Let 𝑈 be a user in the CLC system and
𝑈 be a user in the PKI system. Let 𝐶 = (𝐶 , , 𝐶 , , 𝐶 , , 𝐶 , ) and 𝐶 = (𝐶 , , 𝐶 , , 𝐶 , , 𝐶 , ) be the ciphertexts of 𝑈 and𝑈 ,
respectively. The Test algorithm for heterogeneous systems works as follows:

The Test algorithm returns 1 if 𝑒(𝐶 , , 𝑅 ) = 𝑒(𝐶 , , 𝑅 ). Otherwise, it returns the symbol ⊥ .
SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this segment, the security of the HS-PKE-ET scheme is presented. The basic notion of security proof is similar to the scheme in
(Al-Riyami & Paterson, 2003) and (Huang et al., 2015).
Theorem 1: Presuming that 𝐻 , 𝐻 , 𝐻 are random oracles and assume that the BDH problem is hard. Therefore, our HS-PKE-ETCLC is OW-CCA secure. Significantly, assume there is a Type-1 adversary 𝒜 that has advantage 𝜀 (𝜆) against the HS-PKEpartial secret key queries, 𝑞 trapdoor
ET-CLC. Assume that 𝒜 makes 𝑞 public key queries, 𝑞 secret key queries, 𝑞
replace public key queries, 𝑞 decryption queries, 𝑞 hash queries to 𝐻 , and 𝑞 hash queries to 𝐻 . Thus, we
queries, 𝑞
have an algorithm ℬ which breaks BDH problem with advantage at least 𝜀 (𝜆)/𝑒(𝑞 + 𝑞 + 𝑞 + 1). 𝑞 .
Theorem 2: Presuming that 𝐻 , 𝐻 , 𝐻 are random oracles and assume that the BDH problem is hard. Therefore, our HS-PKE-ETCLC is OW-CCA secure. Significantly, assume there is a Type-2 adversary 𝒜 that has advantage 𝜀 (𝜆) against the HS-PKEET-CLC. Assume that 𝒜 makes 𝑞 public key queries, 𝑞 secret key queries, 𝑞 trapdoor queries, 𝑞 decryption queries, 𝑞
hash queries to 𝐻 , and 𝑞 hash queries to 𝐻 . Thus, we have an algorithm ℬ which breaks BDH problem with advantage at least
𝜀 (𝜆)/𝑒(𝑞 + 𝑞 + 1). 𝑞 .
Theorem 3: HS-PKE-ET-PKI is OW-CCA secure against the adversary 𝒜 if CDH problem is intractable.
Proof: Assume that 𝒜 is an adversary, who is permitted to make qk key generation queries, decryption queries, 𝑞 trapdoor queries,
𝑞 hash queries to 𝐻 , and 𝑞 hash queries to 𝐻 . The algorithm ℬ emulates certain games, dominates oracle 𝑂𝐾 , 𝑂𝐷 , 𝑂𝑇 , 𝑂 ,
and 𝑂 , and then utilizes the advantage of 𝒜 to break CDH problem if 𝒜 breaks HS-PKE-ET-PKI. Consequently, a sequence of
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hybrid games are presented for verification of the security of our scheme. Due to the limited number of pages, the interested

readers can refer to (Al-Riyami & Paterson, 2003) and (Huang et al., 2015) for more details.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In Table 1, the computation cost and communication cost of the proposed HS-PKE-ET scheme and the schemes in (Yang et al., 2010),
(Ma, Huang, et al., 2015), (Ma, 2016), (Lin et al., 2016), and (Qu et al., 2018) are compared.

Schemes

|PK|

|SK|

(Yang et al., 2010)
(Ma et al., 2015)
(Ma, 2016)
(Lin et al., 2016)
(Qu et al., 2018)
HS-PKE-ET

𝔾
3𝔾
2𝔾
2𝔾
2𝔾
2𝔾

2𝑍
3𝑍
2𝑍
2𝑍
2𝑍
2𝑍

Table 1: Comparison
|CT|
3𝔾+𝑍
5𝔾+𝑍
4𝔾+𝑍
5𝔾+𝑍
5𝔾+𝑍
3𝔾+𝑍

Enc

Dec

Test

H-ET

3Exp
6Exp
6Exp
6Exp
5Exp
5Exp

3Exp
5Exp
2Pair+2Exp
2Pair+2Exp
2Pair+2Exp
2Pair+2Exp

2Pair
2Pair+2Exp
4Pair
4Pair
4Pair
3Pair+1Exp

No
No
No
No
No
Yes

Legends: |PK|, |SK|, and |CT|: size of public key, size of secret key, size of and ciphertext, respectively; Enc, Dec, and Test: the computation
complexity of encryption, decryption, and test algorithms; Exp: an exponentiation operation; Pair: pairing operation; H-ET: the scheme that
provides heterogeneous equality test.

CONCLUSION
We nominate an efficient equality test for heterogeneous systems in this paper. The nature of the heterogeneity in our scheme
allows for a cloud server to accomplish an equivalence test between ciphertexts that have been encrypted under the PKI system and
CLC system. Furthermore, we have reduced our scheme’s security proof to the standard Bilinear Di e-Hellman assumption and
computational Diffie-Hellman assumption by basing it on the random oracle model. Our speculative analysis and simulations from
experiments indicate our scheme’s practicability and suitability in comparison to other related works. Future works include
expansion of the heterogeneous equality test to make provision for users to delegate a cloud server rights to execute equality test
employing different types of authorizations.
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